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I. INTRODUCTION
“America cannot continue to lead the family of nations around the
world if we suffer the collapse of the family here at home.”1 When Mitt
Romney sought the Republican nomination for the 2008 presidential election, this quote appeared on the home page of his website.2 Although it is
true that the nuclear family, meaning the familial unit comprised of a father,
mother, and children, is no longer the norm in today’s society, does this
mean America’s familial values are collapsing?3 And if they are, what can
be done to restore them, as so-called nontraditional families are becoming
more traditional than the nuclear family?4
Romney is right about one thing: the nuclear family is not standard in
America anymore.5 Between January 2013 and April 24, 2013, there were
2,096,000 marriages in the United States.6 Per one thousand people, there
were 6.8 marriages.7 Conversely, per one thousand people, there were 3.6
divorces, meaning essentially half of all marriages ended in divorce.8 Due
to the increase in divorces, family structures have undergone a major
change. Grandparents are taking on parental roles, legal guardians are being
appointed, and children have multiple stepparents. For example, in 2009,
the United States Census Bureau reported 9,383,000 grandparents were
responsible for the care of, or lived with, their grandchildren.9 Additionally,
in 2010, the United States Census Bureau reported 38,705,000 of all households in America were considered non-family, meaning “a household maintained by a person living alone or with non-relatives only.”10 This was a

1.
Candy Crowley, Romney Kicks Off White House Bid, CNN (Feb. 13, 2007, 2:38
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/02/13/romney.announce/index.html.
2.
Id.
3.
Nuclear Family Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/nuclear%20family (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
4.
See id.
5.
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FastStats: Marriage and Divorce (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm.
6.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FastStats: Marriage and Divorce
(Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
United States Census Bureau, Grandparents Living with Grandchildren by Race
and
Sex:
2009
(June
27,
2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0070.pdf.
10.
United States Census Bureau, Nonfamily Households by Age and Sex of
Householder:
2010
(June
27,
2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0071.pdf;
National
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drastic increase from 1990, when only 27,257,000 of all households were
considered non-family.11
Furthermore, not only are familial living arrangements changing, but
the structure of the family has also undergone transformation.12 For instance, the number of births to unmarried mothers has increased.13 In 1990,
350,000 live births were to unmarried women fifteen to nineteen years
old.14 Yet, in 2008, 377,000 of live births were to unmarried women fifteen
to nineteen years old.15 If Romney’s assertion was correct, then it is natural
to inquire what can be done to protect children who are being born into
non-traditional families to ensure they are receiving the care that is needed.
Yet, for all intents and purposes, Romney is incorrect. We are not suffering
the collapse of the family in America. The familial structure is undergoing a
transformation, proving an ancient Igbo and Yoruba proverb to be correct:
“It takes a whole village to raise a child.”16
In Illinois, custody determinations are made based on the factors in the
best interest of child standard.17 Some of the factors courts consider in determining custody are whom the child’s parents want the child to be placed
with, the child’s preferences as to his guardian, the interaction of the child
with his parents, and the willingness of each parent to facilitate a relationship between the other parent and the child.18 While this is a good standard
to maintain, with the changes in the familial structure and an increase in the
number of “potential parents,” legislatures and courts need to do more in
determining the custody placement of a child. Scholars argue that the best
interest of the child standard is outdated because “it has been used to justify
trends toward joint custody . . . twisting a standard for children to serve

Telecommunications
&
Information
Administration,
Glossary,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/fttn99/glossary.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
11.
United States Census Bureau, Nonfamily Households by Age and Sex of
Householder:
2010
(June
27,
2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0071.pdf.
12.
See United States Census Bureau, Births to Unmarried Women by Race,
Hispanic Origin, and Age of Mother: 1990 to 2008
(June 27, 2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0085.pdf.
13.
See id.
14.
United States Census Bureau, Births to Unmarried Women by Race, Hispanic
Origin,
and
Age
of
Mother:
1990
to
2008
(June
27,
2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0085.pdf.
15.
Id.
16.
African Proverbs, Sayings and Stories, AFRIPROV.ORG (Nov. 1998),
http://www.afriprov.org/index.php/african-proverb-of-the-month/23-1998proverbs/137november-1998-proverb.html.
17.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2012).
18.
Id.
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adults.”19 Therefore, the equitable parent doctrine, also known as paternity
by estoppel or de facto parentage, should be adopted to supplement the best
interest of the child standard.20
Several states, including, but not limited to, Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Rhode Island, New York, and Iowa, have adopted the equitable parent doctrine.21 The statutes adopted by these states have varying impacts due to the
fact that equitable parent legislation is codified with different language and
intent. Therefore, in an effort to gain the best understanding of how jurisdictions have treated the equitable parent doctrine, this Comment will examine these states’ statutes. The Illinois legislature is considering making
changes to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act that might
reflect legislation similar to an equitable parent doctrine, but no official
action has been taken yet.22 Essentially, the equitable parent doctrine examines what action should be taken when a non-biological parent seeks to establish parentage or gain visitation rights to a child.23 For example, consider
a scenario where the child’s biological mother is married to a man who
presumes he is the father.24 However, the biological mother actually had an
affair, and the biological father is a man that is not her husband.25 In this
case, at the child’s birth, the mother, the biological father, and the biological mother’s husband could all establish parentage.26 Similarly, in a case
where a gay or lesbian couple uses a surrogate, it could be argued the surrogate should have rights to the child, in order to provide the child with a
father and a mother. However, this Comment will focus on the rights of a
biological father versus a father who was married to the mother at the time
of the child’s birth.27
In relevant statutes, parental relationships are referred to in the singular. For example, the Illinois legislature has defined parental relationships
as “the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”28 So, it appears it was not the legislative intent for children to have
more than one legal father or mother.29 Yet, courts are liberalizing their
19.
Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337 (2008).
20.
See id.
21.
2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION
CASES, IN THIRD PARTY CUSTODY AND VISITATION § 10.4 (2d ed. 2013).
22.
H.B. 6192, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
23.
2 HARALAMBIE, supra note 21.
24.
See, e.g., In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 2013). See infra Part
IV.A for a full case discussion on In re Parentage of J.W.
25.
See, e.g., id.
26.
Id.
27.
See infra Part VI.
28.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 et seq. (2012).
29.
See id.
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decisions regarding marriage, and since child rearing is an integral part of
marriage, courts should consider how this liberalization will affect the upbringing of children.30
This Comment will argue that the Illinois General Assembly should
adopt a type of equitable parent doctrine, specifically to help biological
fathers who were not married to the mother of their child, when another
man was presumed to be the child’s father. To begin, this Comment will
explore equitable parent legislation in other states and will propose legislation as it might be codified in Illinois.31 Then, this Comment will apply the
new legislation to other Illinois court decisions to determine the results of
the cases if the proposed legislation had previously been adopted and
whether the equitable parent doctrine produces the best result.32 This Comment will specifically be exploring the following questions: (1) Does the
equitable parent have standing to bring a lawsuit? (2) Is it in the child’s best
interest to have three parents? (3) When is acting like a parent enough, like
in the case of an individual whose intent is not only to love and provide for
the child, but also make the child a permanent part of the family? (4) What
effect would the equitable parent doctrine have on child support obligations?
Illinois courts have recognized this is an important issue to consider.
Recently, the Third District, while contemplating whether to award parental
rights to the mother, biological father, and a man who believed he was the
biological father, stated:
The various issues tackled in this trial court . . . will continue to arise until the legislature modifies existing statutory presumptions of paternity. Perhaps, the lawmakers could
require a [Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity] father
to show proof of a genetic connection to the child before an
unchallenged VAP creates a conclusive and nonrebuttable
statutory presumption for a court to apply in a parentage
action.33
Therefore, the equitable parent doctrine should be adopted in Illinois.34

30.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (overturning the Defense of Marriage Act); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (overturning part of Utah’s bigamy law prohibiting cohabitation among polygamous couples as unconstitutional).
31.
See infra Parts III and V.
32.
See infra Part VI.
33.
In re Custody of C.C., 1 N.E.3d 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2013) (internal
citations omitted). See Part VI.D for a full case discussion on In re Custody of C.C.
34.
See id.

34
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II. WHAT IS THE EQUITABLE PARENT DOCTRINE?
The equitable parent doctrine accomplishes one of three things: (1) estops a man who has held himself out as the child’s parent from later denying parentage; (2) helps a father who is not the biological father, but who
has held himself out as the father, to establish parentage; or (3) helps a father who is the biological father, who did not, or has not, held himself out
as the father, to establish parentage.35 Essentially, this doctrine provides a
non-biological parent the opportunity to bring a cause of action to establish
parentage or gain custody of a child, or it helps an unknowing biological
father establish a parent-child relationship.36
The equitable parent doctrine was first examined in Atkinson v. Atkinson, where a husband and wife were undergoing a divorce proceeding.37
During litigation, it was determined the father was not the biological parent
of the parties’ son.38 The court determined that an individual who is not the
child’s biological parent, but who desires to be recognized as such, who is
willing to support the child, and who wants the right of visitation or custody, might be considered a parent.39 In this case, the child was conceived and
born during the marriage, and the non-biological father had a strong relationship with the child.40 Additionally, the non-biological father supported
the child, he was active in the child’s life, and he wanted the rights typically
given to the father in order to be responsible for the child.41 Furthermore,
the biological mother admitted that the child considered her husband to be
his father.42 Due to these factors, the Michigan Court of Appeals first
acknowledged the equitable parent doctrine as an option for non-biological
parents to establish a legal parent-child relationship.43

35.
Alan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who is Not Biological or
Adoptive Father of Child But was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child was Conceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655 (originally published in 1991).
36.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
37.
Id. at 517.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 520.
41.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
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III. EQUITABLE PARENT LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES
A.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

No two states have adopted the same version of the equitable parent
doctrine.44 In fact, equitable parent doctrine legislation varies vastly from
state to state.45 The American Law Institute has written model legislation
for the states to follow, which has:
Endorsed the concept of parentage by estoppel for a person
who lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out
and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent,
as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s
legal parent to raise a child together each with full parental
rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as parent is in the child’s best interests . . . .46
This statute would be difficult to satisfy in a situation where there are
two potential fathers because it is impossible for two fathers to accept full
and permanent responsibilities as a parent.47 Arguably, however, it is also
impossible for a mother and a father to accept full responsibilities as a parent, since the responsibilities would naturally have to be shared between the
two.48 Therefore, two fathers and a mother could all accept full responsibilities as parents.49
B.

PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has adopted a more lenient rule,
which indicates, “[P]aternity by estoppel continues to pertain . . . but it will
apply only where it can be shown, on a developed record, that it is in the
best interests of the involved child.”50 This rule is particularly interesting
See 2 HARALAMBIE, supra note 21.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(b) (Am. Law Inst.)).
47.
See id.
48.
See id.
49.
See 2 HARALAMBIE, supra note 21.
50.
K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 810 (Pa. 2012). Here, the mother sought to
obtain support from the man she presumed was the child’s biological father, even though she
was married to another man at the time of the child’s birth. Id. at 799. The biological father
tried to rely on the marital presumption to prove he was not the biological father, but the
court determined the mother could seek support from the biological father in spite of the
marital presumption. Id. at 799, 811.
44.
45.
46.
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because the only requirement is having an equitable parent be in the best
interest of the child, which is unlike the American Law Institute model statute that is filled with ambiguous requirements.51 However, it could be argued that Pennsylvania’s statute is too lenient, since it could effectively be
granting parentage to three separate parents, based solely on the best interests of the child, and without considering the potential parent’s involvement
in the child’s life.52 Conversely, portions of the Pennsylvania rule are too
strict.53 For example, Pennsylvania does not allow a DNA test when a father has previously acknowledged he is the child’s biological parent.54 Rather, a DNA test is permitted only when paternity by estoppel does not apply, in order to advance the best interests of the child and promote the familial unit.55 Disallowing DNA tests is an attempt by Pennsylvania courts
to not disrupt families that have been established for several years.56 However, the rule is too strict in certain situations, such as where the child needs
to know who his biological father is for medical history purposes.57
C.

MICHIGAN

Michigan established the equitable parent doctrine in Atkinson.58
However, Michigan refused to extend the doctrine to an unmarried man, but
does extend it to a man whose girlfriend gives birth to a child during their
relationship.59 Michigan’s rule will not produce the best result in instances
when two men are potentially the father of a child whose mother is married.60
D.

RHODE ISLAND

The Rhode Island statute created a rebuttable presumption that a man
is the father of a child is created when one of six requirements are met: (1)
the child was born to a man and woman who are married or the marriage
51.
See id.
52.
See id.
53.
See generally Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1995).
54.
Freedman, 654 A.2d at 529.
55.
Id.
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
58.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
59.
Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 26 (Mich. 1999). The court chose to not extend
the theory to unmarried individuals for several reasons: the court felt the legislature was
better able to handle this problem, the Child Custody Act did not recognize the equitable
parent doctrine outside marriage, and the court wanted to reinforce the institution and legitimacy of marriage. Id. at 20-22.
60.
See id.
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has been terminated within 300 days; (2) the man and woman attempted to
marry prior to the child’s birth; (3) after the child’s birth, the man and
woman attempted to marry; (4) the man acknowledges he is the father in a
writing filed with the family law court clerk; (5) a blood test proved he is
the father; or (6) both the mother and father sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.61 Rhode Island courts established that a “de facto parentchild relationship is . . . based on a finding of a ‘parent-like relationship
with the child that could be substantial enough to warrant legal recognition
of certain parental rights and responsibilities’ respecting the child.”62 This
state’s statute is interesting because it sets forth a requirement to establish
parentage under the equitable parent doctrine, but it does not make it impossible for several parents to establish their rights.63 One potential issue
with this statute is that it gives deference to the court to decide who the
parent is, since the relationship need only be substantial enough to warrant
legal recognition.64 Substantial is defined as “consisting of or relating to
substance,” which leaves a lot of room for judicial interpretation.65 Arguably, this rule is less effective than Pennsylvania’s, which established that
the best interests of child standard still applies.66
E.

NEW YORK

New York’s rule presents a unique issue. In New York, “both civil union and adoption require the biological or adoptive parent’s legal consent,
as opposed to the indeterminate implied consent featured in the various
tests proposed to establish de facto or functional parentage.”67 As a result, if
a man is unsure whether he is the child’s father, he can choose to commence a relationship with the child, or he can request a DNA test prior to
acknowledging paternity.68 So, an interesting problem is presented when the
biological mother had an affair on her husband, and the man she had an
affair with is the biological father.69 According to New York law, the biological father would hold the power to grant the biological mother’s hus-

61.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-3 (West 2013).
62.
Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I. 2009), referring to Rubano v.
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
63.
See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-3 (West 2013).
64.
See Brown, 966 A.2d at 1254, referring to Rubano, 759 A.2d 959.
65.
Substantial
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/substantial (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
66.
See id.
67.
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010).
68.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 418 (McKinney 2014).
69.
See id.
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band de facto parentage.70 However, if there is tension between the biological father and mother, or if the biological father did not know the biological
mother was married, then the child could be used by the biological father as
a pawn because he might withhold granting de facto parentage in order to
retaliate against the biological mother.71 Therefore, this statute is not written most effectively.
F.

IOWA

Iowa has an especially intriguing equitable parent doctrine. Iowa rejects equitable parentage in cases when a man lived with the mother and the
child, but never married the mother.72 However, Iowa applies the doctrine
where the man is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, but
learns, at dissolution of marriage, that he was not the genetic father.73 On its
face, this doctrine seems like it could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 Iowa appears to grant more
rights to a married father who learned of his lack of parentage at divorce, as
opposed to an unmarried father who actually lived with the mother and
child.75
G.

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

Unlike Iowa, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has considered certain
factors that might be examined in order to find an individual is a de facto
parent. The factors the court considered in its decision include: (1) misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; (2) estopped party is aware of
the material facts; (3) the other party does not know about these material
facts; (4) the estopped party acts expecting that his conduct will be acted
upon; and (5) the other party changed positions to its detriment based on
70.
See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 418 (McKinney 2014); Debra H., 930
N.E.2d 184.
71.
See generally N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 418 (McKinney 2014); Debra H., 930
N.E.2d 184.
72.
Petition of Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1993). Here, the putative father held
himself out as the child’s father by bathing and feeding the child, and providing emotional,
financial, and psychological support. Id. at 401. Additionally, the putative father continuously supported the child by paying for preschool, toys, and dance lessons. Id. at 402. However,
the court refused to find the putative father was an equitable parent because he had no legal
basis to establish parentage since he was not the biological father, adoptive father, foster
parent, etc. Id. at 404.
73.
Id. at 403-04.
74.
See id. The doctrine might be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it creates a disparate impact between married fathers
and unmarried fathers. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
75.
Petition of Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400.

2014]

PROTECTING THE SANCTITY OF FAMILY

39

this conduct.76 In addition to providing for a child alongside the natural
parent, the de facto parent must stand in the place of the natural parent.77
These factors set forth a bright line standard in order to help parties determine exactly what constitutes de facto parenting and what will not qualify.78 However, one of the factors potentially raises a variety of issues: the
estopped party must act with the expectation her conduct will be relied upon.79 For example, consider a situation where the biological mother has a
one time affair with another man, she does not expect a child to be conceived, and she continues a sexual relationship with her husband. A child is
actually conceived during the affair, but she presumes the biological father
is her husband. By presuming this, the biological mother does not act in a
malicious way, nor does she expect the biological father or her husband to
rely to their detriment on her actions. This is problematic because the two
potential fathers could argue the mother acted with the expectation her conduct would be relied upon. Yet, it would be difficult for her to prove what
assumption she proceeded under in choosing her course of conduct. Additionally, the Hinshaw court’s holding effectively eliminates the possibility
that two separate men could have parental rights to the same child by saying a de facto parent cannot provide for a child alongside the natural parent,
but must stand in the actual parent’s shoes because it is impossible for two
people to stand in the actual parent’s shoes.80 However, a response to this
argument might be similar to the response to criticisms of the American
Law Institute’s model legislation: if two parents can ordinarily be actual
parents, then three parents can be actual parents. Therefore, while this holding sets forth good factors to follow, Kentucky’s rule is not free from potential problems.
H.

WEST VIRGINIA

The doctrine regarding de facto guardians has also been examined in
the context of adoption.81 West Virginia, for example, declined to take the
view that an express or implied contract to adopt was absolutely necessary
to establish that an equitable adoption had taken place where a person has
76.
Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007) (citing J. Branham
Erecting & Steel Serv. Co. v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 880 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1994)). In Hinshaw, the court determined equitable estoppel is applicable to custody cases. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 174-75. The court looked at the factors that Kentucky
courts typically consider when determining equitable estoppel cases. Id. at 173.
77.
See id.
78.
See id.
79.
See id.
80.
See id.
81.
See Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).

40
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“stood from an age of tender years in a position exactly equivalent to a formally adopted child.”82 In essence, West Virginia has established that no
formal process needs to be followed in a situation where a child has not
been officially adopted, but has been held out as an adopted child for many
years.83 The West Virginia court’s line of reasoning can be extended to the
question regarding two potential fathers, because the sole requirement is
that the child is held out as a formally adopted child. Similarly, perhaps the
standard to establish a man is a de facto parent could be a man who has held
himself out as the child’s father since the child’s tender years.84
I.

CALIFORNIA

In California, there must be a direct expression of intent to adopt the
claimant in order to prove an equitable adoption.85 This might also be a
good standard to consider when determining de facto parentage in Illinois.86
For example, basic fairness indicates that a father who has expressed a direct intent to act as the father, even though he is not the presumed father,
should be granted rights of some kind so long as there is testimony he is fit
to be a parent.87
It is important to note that all courts place great emphasis on the Fourteenth Amendment in making determinations regarding the equitable parent
doctrine.88 “[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”89

IV. INDICATION OF HOW ILLINOIS COURTS MIGHT TREAT
EQUITABLE PARENTS
A.

DEHART V. DEHART

Whether a child can have a legal mother and two legal fathers is a case
of first impression in Illinois.90 As a result, Illinois has not adopted the equi82.
Id.
83.
See id.
84.
See id.
85.
In re Estate of Ford v. Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 749 (Cal. 2004).
86.
See id.
87.
See id.
88.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
89.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)). The Supreme Court refused to force a mother who was unwilling to give the paternal grandparents as much visitation as they were asking. Id. at 102.
90.
In re Custody of C.C., 1 N.E.3d 1238, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 2013).
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table parent doctrine.91 However, there are court opinions that indicate how
Illinois might treat equitable parents.92 First of all, there have been scenarios in Illinois where a biological parent’s rights have been terminated, and
two non-biological parents adopted the child.93 In these situations, the court
has held a child can have two mothers or fathers based on the termination of
parental rights and subsequent adoption.94 Second, consider a recent Illinois
Supreme Court decision, DeHart v. DeHart.95 In this case, a stepfather did
everything he could to adopt his stepson, including telling the community
he was the biological father and forging a birth certificate so the stepson
would not know he was not the biological son.96 However, the stepfather
never executed a statutory adoption contract.97 Ultimately, the stepson
learned the stepfather was not his biological parent, but the stepfather continued to hold the stepson out as his son by listing him as his son in his funeral arrangements, paying for a trip for the stepson’s family, and executing
a will leaving bequests to the stepson.98 Once the stepfather died, the stepson sought to claim his inheritance, but learned his stepfather wrote him out
of the will at a time when he lacked testamentary capacity.99 The stepson
then tried to establish he should still have rights to what was in the original
will because his stepfather held him out as his son.100
The DeHart court indicated in certain situations where a contract to
adopt does not exist, circumstantial evidence can support the equitable
adoption.101 Therefore, in cases where it can be proven by clear and convincing evidence that a parent consistently and publicly treated the child as
his own blood relative, and so long as the child believed he was the parent’s
biological child, the child should not be denied his inheritance because his
parents failed to comply with statutory provisions.102 Therefore, the court
effectively adopted a version of equitable adoption.103

91.
17 ILL. PRAC., ESTATE PLANNING & ADMIN. § 32:6 (4th ed.).
92.
See, e.g., DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2013).
93.
See In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995)
(holding unmarried same-sex cohabitants have standing to petition to adopt a child); Connor
v. Velinda C., 826 N.E.2d 1265, 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2005) (holding adoptive mothers of a previous same-sex marriage can seek to establish custody with their child).
94.
See Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d at 899; Connor, 826 N.E.2d at 1273.
95.
DeHart, 986 N.E.2d at 85.
96.
Id. at 90.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 91.
100.
DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ill. 2013).
101.
Id. at 103.
102.
Id. at 103-04.
103.
Id.
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After the DeHart case, there is good reason to believe Illinois could be
moving toward adopting the equitable parent doctrine.104 However, the
DeHart ruling seems strict, especially in situations where the biological
fathers did not know, nor did they have reason to know they were the
child’s father.105 In that case, courts should examine whether it is in the
child’s best interest to deny him a relationship with a loving individual who
wants to be part of the child’s life.
B.

KOELLE V. ZWIREN

Consider Koelle v. Zwiren, where the mother of a child lied to a man
she had a brief sexual relationship with and told him he was the biological
father of her daughter, even though she was certain he was not.106 For eight
years, the purported father became very involved in the child’s life.107 He
babysat, assisted in her extracurricular activities, took her to various outings, and accompanied the child and biological mother on a family vacation.108 However, he ultimately conducted a paternity test, which determined he was not the father of the child.109 In its opinion, the court said
awarding visitation to a nonparent over a parent’s objections is permissible
if it is in the best interest of the child.110 Therefore, the court held that visitation is possible for an unwed, non-biological father who parented for eight
years while the biological mother misrepresented his genetic ties.111 Therefore, Illinois courts have recognized visitation rights for nonparents, which
indicates Illinois might recognize a type of equitable parent.112
C.

IN RE MARRIAGE OF ROBERTS

Another case that indicates how Illinois courts might treat equitable
parents is In re Marriage of Roberts.113 In that case, a husband filed for
divorce against his wife, and during the proceedings, he learned he was not
the biological father of the child born during their marriage.114 The court
determined “that the superior right of natural parents is not absolute” in
determining parentage, and therefore, custody to a non-biological father
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 103 (Ill. 2013).
Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872.
Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
See id.
In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
Id.
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was possible where the child was born to his wife during their marriage.115
As a result, the court essentially granted the father de facto parenting
rights.116

V. POTENTIAL LEGISLATION
Some courts have treated single parents poorly. Consider In the Interest of Ice.117 In this case, a single father, who knew about the minor child,
neglected to be part of the child’s life for three years.118 The court found the
father to be an unfit parent and held that because the father failed to provide
any kind of support to the child, he had “bastardized” the child.119 In its
holding, the court said “[this] conduct consisted not only of a denial of paternity and lack of support, but an inexcusable lack of interest, concern, and
responsibility for his son’s welfare.”120 In a case where a parent purposefully neglects their child for several years, perhaps this is a reasonable response from the court.121 However, this is not a fair standard in a case
where the biological father was not aware he has a child.122 Therefore, the
court should consider the equitable parent doctrine when making custody
determinations regarding a biological father who was unaware he was the
father.123
Although Illinois has not adopted any equitable parent legislation, this
Comment will suggest legislation as it might be adopted in Illinois. The
trial court should be given broad discretion in making a determination. In
other words, the appellate court should review the trial court’s decision only
for an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the trial court should examine the
totality of the circumstances in making its decision, because the court
would essentially be granting a stranger legal visitation rights. Therefore, in
addition to the best interests of the child standard, the equitable parent’s
criminal background, work history, and financial status should be scrutinized by the court in order to determine whether the person should be
granted rights to the child.
Kentucky’s equitable parent doctrine is most likely to produce a just
result, since it considers a variety of factors which set forth a bright-line

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1350-51.
See id.
In the Interest of Ice, 342 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1976).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 462.
Id.
See id.
See In the Interest of Ice, 342 N.E.2d 460, 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1976).
See id.
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standard.124 Therefore, Illinois should use Kentucky’s equitable parent doctrine as a model.125 Primarily, the legislation should discriminate between
individuals who have standing to seek to establish parentage and those who
do not.126 Those who have standing to seek to establish parentage include
men who, for the first two years of the child’s life, resided in a household
with the child and openly held the child out as his own during that time.127
On the other hand, a biological father, who has not held himself out to be
the child’s father, would have standing to seek to establish parentage if five
different factors are met.128 First, the biological mother’s conduct, including
acts, language, or silence, must amount to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.129 Second, the mother must be aware of these
facts.130 Third, the biological father must be unaware of these facts.131
Fourth, the mother must act with the intention or expectation that her representation or concealment of material facts will be acted upon.132 Fifth, the
biological father must rely on the biological mother’s conduct to his detriment.133
In addition, the legislation should establish a limitation on the amount
of time a person has to bring a cause of action to establish parentage.134 In
the first scenario, where a man is aware he is the father and has held himself
out as the child’s father for the first two years of the child’s life, the statute
of limitations to bring the cause of action to establish parentage should be
one year after he moves out of the home where the child lives.135 The justification for a shorter timeframe is to avoid allowing fathers to statutorily
enter the child’s life whenever he pleases or deems convenient for him.136
However, for a father who does not know he is the child’s biological parent,
the statute of limitations should be more ambiguous.137 Once the father
knew or reasonably should have known he was the child’s father, he has
one year to bring a cause of action to determine whether he is fit to establish parentage.138 The policy consideration surrounding a more ambiguous
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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statute is that the father did not try to establish parentage at an earlier time
because he did not know he was the child’s father due to the biological
mother’s misrepresentations.139 However, he should still have only one year
after he knows or reasonably should have known he is the child’s father
because at that point, he is in an equal position as a father who did know he
was or was not the biological parent since he held himself out as one.140 A
father is deemed to reasonably have known he was the child’s father based
on the objective reasonable person standard.141 An example of this is seeing
a picture of a child whom looks similar to him on a woman’s social media
website, who the potential father previously had a sexual relationship
with.142
However, it should be duly noted that this is not an attempt to grant
biological fathers the absolute right to parent.143 Under no circumstances is
the statute to be construed as giving fathers the ability to ignore the child
until he is older and more fun.144 In other words, the father should not rely
on the biological mother to rear the child until the child is more selfsufficient.145 In J.S.A. v. M.H., the court held “the right of a biological father to establish paternity to a child born to a marriage does not also mean
that the legal rights flowing from the parent and child relationship are automatically conferred.”146 Therefore, the father must show an honest intent
to want to be part of the child’s life.147 But, the fact that a man is a child’s
biological father does not mean he has automatic rights to parenthood.148

VI. APPLYING THE LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS
A.

IN RE PARENTAGE OF J.W.

First, consider the recent case of In re Parentage of J.W.149 Here, a
woman named Amy was dating a man named Jason.150 During the course of
their relationship, Amy had a one-time affair with Steve.151 Amy subse139.
See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
140.
See id.
141.
See id.
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
144.
See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
145.
See id.
146.
J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 253 (Ill. 2007) (citing In re Parentage of John
M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506-07 (Ill. 2004)).
147.
See J.S.A., 836 N.E.2d at 253.
148.
See id.
149.
In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 2013).
150.
Id. at 700.
151.
Id.
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quently became pregnant, and she assumed Jason was the father of the baby.152 Jason and Amy married, and they lived happily as a couple, with Jason holding himself out as the father of the baby, J.W.153 Amy and Jason
ultimately divorced, and at the dissolution of the marriage, Jason was listed
as the father of J.W., had visitation rights, and child support obligations.154
Seven years later, Steve saw a picture of J.W. on Amy’s social media website.155 He noticed a striking resemblance between his baby pictures and
J.W., which is when he realized J.W. might be his daughter.156 Jason requested a DNA test, and it was conclusively confirmed that Steve was
J.W.’s father.157 Steve then filed a petition to establish paternity in an attempt to obtain visitation rights with J.W.158 In response to Steve’s petition,
Jason sought a hearing on whether it was in J.W.’s best interest to have
visitation with Steve.159
In relying upon the opinion of a psychiatrist, who never observed J.W.
interact with Steve, and the guardian ad litem’s (GAL) recommendation,
the court determined it was not in J.W.’s best interest to have visitation with
him because of the potential adverse effect it could have on J.W.’s cognitive development.160 However, at trial, a different clinical psychologist testified it was in J.W.’s best interest to continue to build a relationship with
Steve, especially since he was able to show her love and affection.161 Additionally, even though Steve was not allowed to visit J.W., due to a court
imposed no-contact order while the action was being litigated, Steve had
continued to provide financial support to J.W., and the clinical psychologist
believed a permanent and stable relationship, like the one Steve was trying
to build, would be good for J.W.’s cognitive development.162 In the footnotes, the court said:
At the outset, we note that Jason has never challenged Steve’s standing to establish the existence of a parent-child relationship, and no attempt has been made or order entered
disavowing Jason’s parental rights either under the Parentage Act or under the judgment of dissolution. Accordingly .
. . we make no determination with regard to either party’s
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ill. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ill. 2013).
Id. at 711.
Id. at 701.
In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 706.
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standing, or as to Jason’s continued legal status as a parent.163
Essentially, Steve was penalized for not knowing he could potentially
be J.W.’s father, and he was stripped of an opportunity to develop a lasting
relationship with his daughter.164
Under this Comment’s proposed legislation, a different result might be
warranted.165 First, it is important to consider whether Steve even had
standing to bring the lawsuit.166 Under the new legislation, recall the five
separate factors that must be satisfied in order for Steve to have standing to
bring the cause of action.167 Pursuant to the legislation, Steve would have
standing to bring a suit to establish parentage.168 First, Amy concealed material facts by not notifying Steve that he could potentially be J.W.’s father.169 Second, Amy was aware of these facts because she knew she had a
sexual relationship with two men within a short period of time, and even
though she knew this, she did not conduct a DNA test to determine who the
child’s biological father was.170 Instead, she chose to guess.171 Third, Steve
was unaware of these facts because he probably did not know that the sexual encounter resulted in a pregnancy, since the facts of the case indicate
Amy and Steve had a one-time sexual relationship.172 Fourth, Amy expected the concealment of material facts would be relied upon, because if
Steve did not know about J.W., he never would have brought a paternity
action, and Amy would have avoided disruption of her relationship with
Jason.173 Lastly, Steve relied upon this concealment, which resulted in a
detrimental change in his position.174
The second thing to consider is whether allowing Steve to have visitation with J.W. is in the child’s best interest.175 It is always important to consider the best interest of the child standard.176 The best interest of the child
standard is the mechanism under which parentage is currently deter-

01.
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166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
See id. at 711.
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See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
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See id.; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 706.
See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 706.
See In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 700.
See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 700.
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See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 706.
See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2012).
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mined.177 Some of the factors that are considered include who the parents
wish to have custody of the child, who the child wants his primary parent to
be, the interaction of the child with his parents, the mental and physical
status of “all individuals involved,” and whether the parents are willing to
facilitate a healthy relationship with other parents.178 It is clear from these
provisions that the statute is not limited to consider only two parents.179 In
fact, these factors insinuate that they could apply to more than two parents
when they indicate the mental and physical health of “all those involved”
should be considered, and “the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his parent or . . . any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest.”180 Therefore, the best interest of the child standard can
apply to a situation where there are more than two parents.181 Courts have
even applied the best interest of the child standard in situations where
grandparents seek custody.182
In addition to the best interest of the child standard, the court should
examine whether the biological father expresses interest, concern, and responsibility for the child’s welfare.183 In considering these three factors, the
court should apply a high standard because the court would be permitting a
man who has been absent from the child’s life, potentially for several years,
to bring a cause of action to have legal visitation with the child.184 Some
potential questions the court might ask include: Does he have a job? Can he
support the child? What is his reputation in the community? Does he have
an education? and/or Should he have considered the possibility of the
child’s existence prior to when he actually did?185
Based upon these considerations, in In re Parentage of J.W., the court
could have found it was in the child’s best interest to have visitation with
Steve.186 It is not fair to unwed biological fathers to deny them parental
rights, just because they were not the presumed father.187 Further, the court
should consider the potential harm to the child that could result from denying visitation from the biological father who has demonstrated interest,

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
2013).
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710-11.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2012).
Lyons v. Lyons, 591 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992).
See Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2007).
See id.
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See id. at 173. But see In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698, 710-11 (Ill.
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concern, and responsibility.188 A child can be protected from a father who is
not serious about establishing parentage because the best interest of the
child standard applies, and the court has to apply a high standard in determining whether the biological father truly has the best interests of the child
at heart.189 Lastly, the court should rely on the testimony of a clinical psychologist, similar to In re Parentage of J.W.190 In the In re Parentage of
J.W. case, the clinical psychologist testified that Steve did not present risk
factors that would be dangerous to J.W.’s development, but rather, the transition could easily be achieved with counseling.191 Therefore, under this
Comment’s proposed legislation, Steve should be granted visitation rights
with J.W.192
This Comment does not ignore the criticisms to the argument that
three people could act as parents. Traditionally, courts have frowned upon
the idea that three individuals could act as parents.193 For example, the Supreme Court, in applying California law, stated, “California law, like nature
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”194 However, especially with
the recent overturn of the Defense of Marriage Act, courts have been liberalizing their views on what a traditional family is.195 Perhaps courts might
consider establishing two categories of parents: residential parent(s) and
parent(s) with visitation. These categories are quite similar to what is already established, and they can be likened to a situation where stepparents
are married, and the children have visitation with their biological parents.196
Another criticism of this viewpoint is that having three parents with
rights causes an issue regarding visitation where two of the parents do not
have joint custody. If there is one residential parent and two parents with
visitation, it is possible that visitation will be unfair.197 For example, if children only spend time with the parents that have weekend visitation, it is
possible the children would not live at the same house for any consecutive
weekend.198 Therefore, situations such as these will require strict restrictions imposed by the court. However, this issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
188.
See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 702.
189.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2012); Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173.
190.
In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 702.
191.
Id.
192.
See Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d at 173; In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d at 702.
193.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
194.
Id. at 118.
195.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Defense of Marriage Act,
Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2012).
197.
See id.
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See id.
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J.S.A. V. M.H.

This case poses a different sort of problem because the marital presumption of paternity comes into play.199 J.S.A. and M.H. were married to
separate individuals.200 While they were both separately married, they engaged in an extramarital sexual affair with each other.201 M.H. became
pregnant and gave birth to T.H.202 On the child’s birth certificate, W.H. was
listed as the biological father because he was married to M.H. when T.H.
was born.203 Ultimately, it was discovered, via a DNA test, that J.S.A. was
the biological father of T.H.; but W.H. continued to raise the child as his
own son.204 J.S.A. subsequently filed a petition to determine the existence
of a father-child relationship with T.H.205 After J.S.A. filed his petition,
M.H. and W.H. filed a petition to adopt T.H.206 The court held as a matter
of law that J.S.A. had standing to bring the cause of action because he did
so prior to the adoption petition being filed.207 However, there was a presumption that W.H. was the father because he was married to the mother
when T.H. was born.208 Yet, the marital presumption of fatherhood is rebuttable.209 Therefore, by establishing he was the father through a DNA test,
J.S.A. overcame the marital presumption of fatherhood.210 As a result, a
man who wants to establish parentage is charged with the burden of overcoming any existing presumptions.211
The proposed legislation would have a different effect on J.S.A. v.
M.H.212 In this case, J.S.A. continued to have an affair with M.H. for three
years after the child was born.213 Only after the affair ended did J.S.A. attempt to establish parentage.214 The proposed equitable parentage legislation should not be used as a tool to anger the other biological parent or as

199.
J.S.A. v. M.H., 893 N.E.2d 682, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2008).
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leverage to get revenge.215 Because the court held J.S.A. had standing to
bring the suit since he filed prior to the adoption petition being filed, this
Comment will also assume J.S.A. had standing under the proposed legislation.216 However, under the proposed legislation, J.S.A. would not be able
to bring this cause of action because M.H. did not conceal material facts.217
J.S.A. was fully aware about W.H.’s existence, so he must have known it
was possible that he was the father.218 He should not be able to establish
parentage after his relationship with M.H. ended, which was three years
into the child’s life.219
C.

IN RE PARENTAGE OF G.E.M.

G.E.M. was born to Renee, a woman who acknowledged relationships
with three men at the time of the child’s conception and birth.220 Two of the
men were at the hospital when the child was born, and Richard acknowledged he was the father of G.E.M.221 However, it was ultimately established
that Richard was not the child’s father.222 When G.E.M. was six years old,
Renee filed a petition to determine the existence of the father-child relationship with Louis, one of the other men whom with she had a sexual relationship.223 Renee also sought to extinguish Richard’s status as G.E.M.’s father.224 However, Louis did not want to be part of G.E.M.’s life, and he did
not want to establish paternity.225 The court held voluntary acknowledgment of paternity must be rescinded within the statutory timeframe of sixty
days.226 If the voluntary acknowledgment is not rescinded within sixty days,
then it is permanent.227 Additionally, parties cannot vacate this voluntary
acknowledgment by agreeing to disregard it.228
This case raises a particularly interesting issue because the biological
father did not want to be part of the child’s life.229 So, In re Parentage of
215.
216.
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220.
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224.
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G.E.M. raises the question of whether the equitable parent doctrine can estop a man from denying parentage.230
As it stands now, the law indicates if voluntary acknowledgment is not
rescinded within sixty days, then it is permanent and can never be revoked.231 The policy consideration behind this is to ensure fathers are certain, when they acknowledge paternity, that they are the parent.232 In other
words, the court is trying to avoid a father acknowledging paternity without
seriously considering whether he is, in fact, the father.233 As a result, one
would be inclined to ask: does the fact that a man voluntarily acknowledged
he was the father, and failed to rescind the acknowledgment within sixty
days, mean that the biological father is relieved of all duties?234 As the law
stands now, the answer to this question is yes.235 But, is this fair? Certainly,
it will encourage a father to get a DNA test before voluntarily acknowledging parentage if he is unsure whether he is the father.236 Yet, it seems as
though the court should not be encouraging husbands to be suspicious of
their wives, nor should courts be encouraging men to deny paternity until it
is conclusively established.237
Consider a scenario where Louis wanted to bring an action to establish
paternity with G.E.M.238 It is arguable that he would not have standing to
bring the action.239 First of all, Renee did not misrepresent any facts.240 She
was candid with the three men that she was unsure who the father was, and,
the fact that two different men were at the hospital when G.E.M. was born
indicated they were aware of this fact.241 Therefore, it is likely that Louis
would not have standing to bring this action, even if he wanted to.242 However, under the facts of this case, it is probably in the best interests of the
child not to force the biological father to take part in the child’s life, especially when there is a man who has willingly held himself out as the father.243 Essentially, the court indicated that Renee cannot force Louis to
230.
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submit to a DNA test.244 This result might seem unfair to Richard with regard to child support, but it has not been conclusively established that Louis
is the father.245
D.

IN RE CUSTODY OF C.C.

In re Custody of C.C. poses another interesting problem because the
biological father was aware of the child’s existence, and he had some inclination that the child may have been his.246 Additionally, the GAL recommended that all three parents be involved in the child’s life.247 In this case, a
woman, Erica, had a sexual relationship with two men, David and Klay, and
she subsequently became pregnant.248 Initially, Erica told Klay he was
probably the father of the unborn child.249 However, Erica told Klay, one
week later, that a doctor said it was “highly unlikely” he was the father of
the child, and when C.C. was born in October 2007, David signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and identified himself as the biological
father.250 Erica and David ended their relationship, and a trial court entered
an order finding Erica and David to be C.C.’s parents.251 Erica was awarded
sole custody, and David was given visitation rights, subject to payment of
child support.252 In 2009, Erica and Klay began dating, and Klay again became suspicious that he was the biological father of C.C.253 As a result,
Klay brought a cause of action in June 2009, but it was dismissed.254 Ultimately, Klay filed three pleadings in July 2009, attempting to gain rights to
the child.255 In the first pleading, Klay asserted Erica and David, fraudulently or due to a material mistake of fact, signed the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.256 In the second pleading, Klay petitioned the court to
order a DNA test to prove he was the biological father of C.C., name Erica
the residential parent with reasonable visitation given to Klay, and fix his
child support obligations at twenty percent of his income.257 In the third
pleading, Klay requested the court vacate any order relating to David being
244.
245.
246.
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248.
249.
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C.C.’s father, because Erica did not contact Klay before David signed the
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, or before filing the paternity action
against David.258 Initially, the court denied Klay’s petition to intervene because it found Klay knew that Erica was pregnant and because David was
conclusively found to be C.C.’s parent.259 However, since David’s obligation to pay child support had been rescinded by the court once he and Erica
moved in together and both contributed to C.C.’s care, Klay asked the court
to reconsider his petition to intervene.260 Subsequently, the court granted
the petition, and Klay was allowed to proceed on his petition to establish
the existence of a parent-child relationship.261 The court ultimately received
verification from a DNA test that Klay was the biological father of C.C.262
A GAL was appointed in this case to represent C.C.’s interests, and he
recommended that all three parents be involved in the child’s life for three
reasons.263 First, C.C., her mother, and David had developed a close relationship while they were living together.264 Second, since David was the
only father figure that three year old C.C. knew, he should continue to be
involved in her life.265 Third, since Klay truly cared for and desired to care
for C.C., then he should have parental rights as her biological father.266 The
trial court issued an order finding the biological father of C.C. to be Klay,
required Klay to pay child support, awarded bi-weekly visitation, but denied Klay’s request to change C.C.’s last name.267
Klay requested his child support be downward deviated to ten percent
instead of the statutorily required twenty percent because David was also
C.C.’s legal father, and he also had an obligation to help Erica provide for
C.C.268 The court denied Klay’s appeal because it was not filed within thirty
days of the trial court’s resolution of the final issue.269 However, the court
pointed out that it is unsure under current law, in a situation where a child
has a legal and conclusively presumed father, whether a biological father
could be forced to pay child support.270 Additionally, the court indicated it
was unclear whether Klay had standing to bring this cause of action.271
258.
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Yet, one of the most interesting aspects of this decision is the dissent.272 The dissent opines that once the trial court determined a parentchild relationship existed between Klay and C.C., the presumption that David was C.C.’s father was terminated.273 Therefore, even though David never requested his parental rights be rescinded, an establishment of a parental
relationship between Klay and C.C would have effectively terminated David’s parental status.274 The dissent cited other Illinois court decisions, such
as In re G.M., which stated, “Obviously, a declaration that one person is a
child’s father necessarily implies that all others are not the child’s father.”275 However, the dissent also stated that this does not mean David
cannot be involved in the child’s life.276 Rather, a best interest hearing
should be conducted to determine whether David should have visitation
with C.C.277 So, even if David’s rights were terminated, the dissent agrees
that two men can have legal rights to visitation with a child.278
In re Custody of C.C. presents a special challenge when the proposed
legislation is applied.279 First, the biological mother’s conduct must be a
misrepresentation of material facts.280 In this case, Erica was upfront with
Klay about the fact that he could be the father of the unborn child.281 However, a week later, she told Klay that a doctor said it was highly unlikely
Klay was the father.282 Therefore, the first criterion is not satisfied because
even though Erica and the doctor were both wrong, Erica did not knowingly
make a material misrepresentation and, for example, hide her pregnancy.283
Should the court find there was a knowing material misrepresentation,
though, neither the second nor third criterion are met.284 The second criterion, which requires the mother be aware of the material misrepresentation of
the facts, is not met because Erica reasonably relied upon her doctor’s advice.285 Additionally, the third criterion indicates the biological father has to
be unaware that he is the potential father.286 However, in this case, Klay
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knew he could be the biological father of C.C.287 Therefore, although the
doctor told Erica it was highly unlikely the father was Klay, he was not
eliminated entirely as the biological father.288 It cannot be said Klay was
unaware that he could be the father of C.C., so the third criteria is not satisfied.289 As a result, Erica did not know her concealment would be acted
upon, and Klay did not rely upon Erica’s concealment to his detriment, so
the fourth and fifth criterion were not satisfied.290 Therefore, in this case,
the proposed legislation would actually produce the opposite result from the
trial court’s holding.291
However, this case does recognize one of the most fundamental issues
with the equitable parent doctrine: How should child support be determined
in a case where two men have legal visitation with a child?292 According to
750 ILCS 5/505, if child support is being determined based on the existence
of one child to be supported, twenty percent of the supporting party’s net
income shall be paid to the custodial parent.293 The statute also indicates the
court has discretion to follow the guideline, or it can deviate if it finds any
relevant factor to support its decision.294 So, should each father be responsible for ten percent of the statutorily required twenty percent?295 Or, should
other factors be considered?

VII. CHILD SUPPORT
This Comment will consider a case from Massachusetts to determine a
solution to each father’s responsibility with regard to child support.296 Because this is a case of first impression in Illinois, outside sources must be
considered.297 In Department of Revenue v. Ryan R., Susan was married to
Sheldon.298 Susan had an extramarital affair with a man named Ryan.299
When Susan became pregnant, she informed Sheldon he was not the father,
and she told Ryan he was the biological father of the child.300 Ultimately,
Sheldon signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity when the child
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was born, but Ryan was not involved in the child’s life.301 The child suffered from a variety of ailments, and a great deal of stress was put on Susan
and Sheldon’s marriage, which eventually ended in divorce.302 During the
divorce proceedings, the court found that even though Sheldon was not the
child’s biological father, he was the only father the child knew, and because
of this, Sheldon was the child’s de facto parent.303 Therefore, Sheldon was
given reasonable visitation, in addition to a child support obligation of seventy-five dollars per week.304 However, the court also indicated that the
ordered child support was not in compliance with statutory guidelines, so
Susan was entitled to additional child support from the biological father.305
On Susan’s behalf, the Department of Revenue filed a complaint to establish that Ryan was the biological father of the child, in an effort to assist
her in obtaining child support.306 The Probate Court examined several factors before determining what child support Ryan would owe.307 These factors include what alimony Susan was receiving, the other child support
payment, and the fifteen thousand dollars annual income that was attributed
to Susan.308 After considering this, the Probate Court determined Ryan’s
yearly income was seventy thousand dollars, and based on that, he would
owe Susan $285 per week in child support.309 Further, he would be responsible for paying the child’s medical expenses.310 The court affirmed this
judgment on review, holding that the Probate Court was correct in making
this determination based on joint federal tax returns Ryan and his wife
filed.311 The court indicated that it would have also been appropriate for the
Probate Court to consider whether Ryan’s wife’s salary made more of
Ryan’s income available to pay additional child support.312 Ironically, although the judgment of this court meant Susan was receiving child support
from two different men, only Sheldon was granted visitation
rights.313Ryan’s claims for custody and visitation were bifurcated from the
301.
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child support hearing, so although he paid child support, he was not given
more legal rights to the child.314
The Ryan R. case is particularly relevant to the proposed legislation
because it contemplates a fix for the child support obligation problem.315
For example, reconsider In re Custody of C.C.316 Had that case turned out
differently, both Klay and David could have been responsible for child support for C.C.317 However, Klay’s proposition that each man pay ten percent
of the statutory guideline will likely fail.318 Rather, courts are more likely to
follow the Ryan R. line of reasoning.319 Arguably, justice is better served
where, instead of splitting the child support payments down the middle, the
payments are equitably determined, for example, based on the child’s
needs, what each parent has provided for the child during the child’s lifetime, and each parents’ income.320

VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Illinois General Assembly should adopt
the equitable parent doctrine, specifically to help biological fathers establish
parentage if another man is presumed to be the child’s father. Illinois courts
have already recognized de facto adoption.321 The DeHart court indicated
where a contract to adopt does not exist, circumstantial evidence can support an equitable adoption.322 Additionally, Illinois courts have indicated
they are open to supporting de facto parentage.323 The Koelle court awarded
visitation to an unwed, non-biological father who held himself out as the
child’s father while the biological mother misrepresented the father’s genetic ties because it was in the child’s best interests.324 Further, an Illinois
court granted custody to a non-biological father because the child was born
to his wife during their marriage, so there was a presumption he was the
biological father.325
In determining what legislation to codify in Illinois, it is important to
consider an array of statutes adopted in other jurisdictions to determine
which will produce the most equitable result in the multitude of scenarios
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that arise in family court. Due to its bright-line test and consideration of
many factors, the Kentucky Supreme Court has established the best equitable parent doctrine.326 Under this consideration, the court considers many
factors, including: (1) misrepresentation or concealment of material facts;
(2) estopped party is aware of the material facts; (3) the other party does not
know about these material facts; (4) the estopped party acts expecting that
his conduct will be acted upon; and (5) the other party changed positions to
its detriment based on this conduct.327
The equitable parent doctrine should be adopted in Illinois because rather than blindly following the marital presumption, courts are forced to ask
questions about the father, such as: Does he have a job? Can he support the
child? What is his reputation in the community? Does he have an education?328 Therefore, while courts are currently relying on factors that seemingly have nothing to do with the child’s best interest, like which clinical
psychologist testified better or who was married to the biological mother at
the time the child was born, after the equitable parent doctrine is adopted,
courts will be considering factors like the father’s involvement in the
child’s life, the father’s intent to act as a parent, and the best interests of the
child.329 Therefore, the equitable parent doctrine should be codified in Illinois, in order to promote the best interests of the child.
Although the nuclear family is no longer the standard in America, was
Romney correct in saying America’s families are collapsing?330 Probably
not. Families are certainly transforming, but instead of claiming they are
collapsing, legislatures should be asking what they can do to ease the transition. The United States Supreme Court has stated, “Our decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of
our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”331 In an effort to protect all
families, both traditional and nontraditional, the equitable parent doctrine
should be adopted as a legislative fix in Illinois that will not burden the
courts, will protect fathers’ rights, and will provide a just solution for the
new, traditional American family.
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